History

The secession of Katanga 1960-1965 case study: exploring causation with students

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Note: Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the historical data contained herein. Any inadvertent errors are regretted.
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The secession of Katanga, 1960-1965: exploring causation with students

In exploring the case study, “The secession of Katanga, 1960-1965 ”, students are following a narrative of events. They are not concerned, however, merely with “ what happened ” (and, even here, there may be conflicts of interpretation) but also with why it happened, and what its historical significance is. In exploring issues of causation and significance with students, we have a great opportunity to develop their ability to think critically, which is one of the stated objectives of the syllabus, and an increasingly cherished aim of senior cycle education.

At previous history in-service sessions, it has been argued that some of the best ways in which students’ critical thinking can be generated include:

- the use of the enquiry-focused approach
- the use of ‘critical skills’ exercises that involve group discussion and judgement-forming

Both approaches are drawn on in the following exploration of the case study.

The enquiry-focused approach

The enquiry-focused approach involves organising a set of lessons around an enquiry question on which the teaching and learning activities are focused. It aims to give a clear focus to a series of lessons, to clarify for all concerned what the learning purposes are and to ensure that the sequence of lessons is leading to improved understanding on the part of the students.

In her book, The Twentieth Century World (The Historical Association, 1997), Christine Counsell outlines the rationale behind the approach. The following is an edited extract:

Choosing a sequence of interesting historical enquiries gives a clear focus to any scheme of work. This approach has a number of advantages:

(i) It prevents a superficial run through the content and leads pupils into deeper levels of historical understanding.
(ii) It allows students to engage in real historical debate. Historians usually begin with a question.
(iii) It motivates students by giving a clear focus to their work. Identifying key questions is a powerful way of ‘sharing clarity with learners’. Teachers are thus reinforcing that the whole point of a sequence of lessons or activities is to build towards some attempt at answering the question. Some teachers who use this approach will refer to such a question in every single lesson. Pupils are constantly reminded of what they are trying to do and why.
(iv) Key questions can shape and limit an otherwise sprawling content.
(v) It encourages pupils to produce more substantial and significant outcomes at the end of a section of work.

(pp.30-31)
**The secession of Katanga, 1960-1965: an overview of the case study and its context**

The partition of Africa which occurred in the last three decades of the 19th century led to the creation of colonial territories many of which had ethnically and economically diverse populations, often with long-standing tribal rivalries or conflicts. Most of these territories became independent countries in or after the 1960s. In a speech in Cape Town, South Africa, on 3rd February, 1960, the British prime minister acknowledged the growing strength of African national consciousness and, in a famous phrase, asserted that “The wind of change is blowing through this continent …”.

As national consciousness grew in the 1950s, however, not all of the European colonial powers were prepared to accept that change was imminent. On the eve of independence the Belgian Congo, a territory larger than Western Europe, had no African army officers, only three African civil servants of managerial rank and only 30 African university graduates. A major reason for Belgian reluctance to seriously consider moves towards independence was the substantial mineral resources (copper, gold, tin, cobalt, diamonds, manganese, zinc) which the Congo contained.

In October, 1958, Patrice Lumumba founded the National Congolese Movement (MNC: Mouvement National Congolais) and, in the following year, led a series of demonstrations and strikes against the Belgian colonial administration. Following widespread rioting in 1959, the Belgian government – to the surprise of all the nationalist leaders - announced that elections for independence would go ahead in May 1960. These elections saw the MNC emerge as the strongest party and Patrice Lumumba became prime minister as Belgium granted independence on 30th June, 1960.

Less than two weeks after independence, however, the mineral-rich province of Katanga seceded under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe. While Belgium withheld formal recognition of the new ‘state’, substantial support for the secession originated in Belgium e.g. recruitment agencies were set up in Brussels for the recruitment of mercenaries to ‘defend’ Katanga; Professor René Clemens of the University of Liège was invited to draft the Katangan constitution; Belgian advisors helped to establish new structures of administration.

As disorder spread throughout the Congo region, Lumumba called for UN assistance and the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, agreed to send in a peace-keeping force. Tshombe allowed a small UN force to enter Katanga; the numbers stationed there were later increased, but had no mandate to force an end to the secession. Diplomatic efforts to achieve reconciliation were unsuccessful. Cold War tensions contributed to an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust.

As disorder increased, an army coup removed Lumumba as premier and he was taken to Katanga where he was murdered in January 1961. The strong international reaction to Lumumba’s death prompted a stronger UN resolution, allowing the use of force as a last resort to check the drift towards anarchy in the Congo. Subsequent clashes between UN peacekeeping troops and Katangese troops prompted Dag Hammarskjold to seek case-fire talks with Moïse Tshombe; on 17th September, 1961, however, Hammarskjold was killed when his plane crashed near Ndola airport in Zambia.

Military defeat by UN forces in January, 1963, led to the gradual ending of the secession, although Tshombe re-surfaced briefly in July, 1964, as leader of the central government. When General Sese Seko Mobutu staged a successful coup in November, 1965, Tshombe was placed on trial for treason in his absence and central control was forcibly implemented.

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Biographical notes

Congolese leaders

**Patrice Lumumba (1925-1961)**

Lumumba worked as a trade union organiser before founding the MNC, the Congo’s first nationwide political party, in 1958. In the same year, he spoke at a major Pan-African conference in Accra, Ghana, where he befriended Kwame Nkrumah, the Ghanian leader. Briefly imprisoned in November 1959 on charges of inciting riots, in May 1960, his party, the MNC, emerged as the strongest single party and Lumumba became prime minister of a coalition government with his rival Joseph Kasavubu, leader of the Bakongo, becoming president. Following the secession of Katanga, Lumumba sought UN support, but frustration with the UN’s reluctance to use force prompted an appeal to the Soviet Union to provide logistical support for an offensive against the secessionists. However, he was dismissed by Kasavubu in September 1960 and, following a military coup led by Colonel Joseph Mobutu in November, he was arrested and transferred to Elizabethville, Katanga, where he was murdered in January, 1961. His death caused widespread scandal throughout Africa, where he was seen as a leader of Pan-Africanism, and generated international pressure for stronger UN security measures against the secessionists.

**Sese Seko (originally, Joseph) Mobutu (1930-1997)**

Mobutu served in the Belgian Congolese army and as a journalist before joining Patrice Lumumba in independence negotiations in Brussels in 1960. When independence was granted, he became chief of staff of the Congolese army. However, as tensions developed between Lumumba and Kasavubu, Mobutu backed Kasavubu and he was instrumental in the decision to turn Lumumba over to the Katanga regime. A background figure in political decision-making for much of the period 1961-1965, he became president when the army seized power in November 1965, establishing single-party rule and remaining in power until overthrown by rebel forces under Laurent Kabila in 1997. (See also p.27)

**Moise Tshombe (1919-1969)**

A successful businessman, Tshombe helped to found the Conakat political grouping which advocated an independent but federal Congo. His power base was in the mineral-rich province of Katanga where he wished to stay in control. After independence in 1960 and the appointment of Patrice Lumumba as prime minister, Tshombe – supported by white mercenaries and Belgian mining interests – declared Katanga independent. When the UN intervened, Tshombe engaged reluctantly in moves at reconciliation; however, following the death of Dag Hammarskjold in a plane crash in September 1961, Tshombe came under more sustained UN pressure and was eventually forced to flee the Congo in June 1963, following the formal ending of secession in January. The spread of rebellion prompted President Joseph Kasavubu to invite him to return as prime minister in June 1964 but his presidential ambitions led to his dismissal by Kasavubu in October 1965. Following Mobutu’s coup in November, Tshombe was put on trial for treason in his absence. He was subsequently kidnapped in June 1967 and handed over to the Algerian government; he died in an Algerian prison in June 1969.
Joseph Kasavubu (1910?-1969)
First president of independent Congo (1960-1965), Kasavubu’s entry into political leadership began when he was elected president of the Bakongo tribal association (ABAKO) in 1954, and he held a number of administrative posts before agreeing to serve as president when Lumumba became prime minister in June 1960. As the US became increasingly concerned about Lumumba’s policies, Kasavubu used his presidential powers to dismiss Lumumba on 5th September and, following Mobutu’s seizure of power on 14th September, Kasavubu reached a working agreement with the army chief which saw him remain on as president until November 1965, when Mobutu mounted a second coup and installed himself as president. Although he accepted an honorary seat in the Senate, he retired to a farm in Mayombe where he died on 24th March, 1969.

Cyrille Adoula (1921-1978)
Premier of the central government of the Congo from August 1961 to June 1964. Adoula, the first native African employee of the Congo Central Bank, was a co-founder with Lumumba and others of the MNC in 1958. His period as premier was difficult with constant civil strife and other internal and external pressures. Attempts to end the secession of Katanga through talks with Tshombe failed. When U.N. secretary-general, U Thant proposed a plan to end the secession and Tshombe failed to implement it, Adoula sought U.N. intervention to enforce it and Tshombe surrendered on 15th January, 1963. Ongoing civil strife prompted Adoula’s resignation as premier in 1964 and his replacement by Tshombe. He later served as ambassador to the United States and to Belgium and, briefly, as foreign minister, retiring from politics in 1970.

UN officials

Dag Hammarskjold (1905-1961)
Secretary-general of the United Nations from 1953, Hamarskjold had served as Swedish foreign minister (1951-1953) and as delegate to various international assemblies including the UN General Assembly. Instrumental in various peace moves in the Middle East Between 1956 and 1958, he was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 1961 after his death in an air crash near Ndola in Zambia in September 1961, whilst engaged in negotiations over the Congo crisis.

Conor Cruise O’Brien (1917-2008)
Born in Dublin, he joined the civil service in 1942, serving in the Department of External Affairs from 1944. From 1956 he was in charge of the United Nations section of External Affairs and a member of the Irish delegation to the General Assembly. At the request of the secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjold, he was released by the Department and appointed UN civilian representative in the Congo, with responsibility for the implementation of UN resolutions on the secession of Katanga. He resigned from the post and from the civil service in December 1961. To Katanga and back, his account of his role in the Congo crisis, was published in 1962. His play Murderous Angels (1968) reflected on the deaths of Lumumba and Hammarskjold.
The secession of Katanga, 1960-1965: timeline of important developments

Before

1885  Congo colonized as personal possession of Belgian King Leopold II

1908  Administration of Congo taken over by Belgian government

The secession

1960  30th June  Congo granted independence; Lumumba becomes prime minister, Kasavubu becomes president

11th July  Moise Tshombe declares independence of Katanga

12th July  Congolese government asks for UN military assistance to protect its territory against external aggression (Belgian troops had been sent in, their declared purpose: to restore law and order and protect Belgian nationals)

14th July  Security Council calls upon Belgium to withdraw its troops

15th July  Lumumba sacked as prime minister by Kasavubu, but defies this move

5th Sept.  Lumumba arrested by troops loyal to Mobutu, army chief of staff

12th Sept.  Mobutu takes control of events but leaves Kasavubu in place as president

27th Nov.  Lumumba escaped house arrest, attempted to contact his followers in the east of the country

1st Dec.  Lumumba captured by troops loyal to Mobutu

1961  17th Jan.  Lumumba sent to Elizabethville (now, Lubumbashi), capital of Katanga and murdered

21st Feb.  UN Security Council passed a resolution permitting the use of force as a last resort by UN troops in the Congo

August  New civilian government under leadership of Cyrille Adoula sought UN help to end secession of Katanga

September  Troops supporting Tshombe and the secession of Katanga clashed with UN forces (Also, in December 1961 and December 1962)

17th Sept.  Dag Hammarskjold died when his plane crashed on the way to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now, Zambia) to engage in talks on a ceasefire

1962  Jan.  Talks on resolving problems, involving Tshombe and Adoula, lasted most of year

Dec.  UN troops attacked Katanga again, causing Tshombe to flee

1963  Jan.  Katanga re-united with rest of Congo

June  Tshombe left the Congo and settled in Spain

1964  June  Growing unrest prompted Kasavubu to invite Tshombe to return to the Congo as prime minister, replacing Adoula

1965  13th Oct.  Tshombe’s growing presidential ambitions prompted Kasvubu to dismiss him

25th Nov.  Mobutu seized power in an army coup

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Names of important towns, then and now

Leopoldville          Kinshasa
Elizabethville        Lubumbashi
Albertville          Kalemie
Stanleyville          Kisangani
Jadotville

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ACRONYMS

ABAKO  Association des Bakongo (leader: Kasavubu)

ANC    Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congolese National Army)

BALUBAKAT  Association Générale des Baluba du Katanga (General Association of Baluba of Katanga)

CONAKAT Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (Confederation of Tribal Associations)

MNC    Mouvement National Congolais (Congolese National Movement)

ONUC   Organisation de Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Organisation in the Congo)

RADECO Rassemblement des Démocrates Congolais (Assembly of Congolese Democrats) [Adoula]

RDC    République Démocratique du Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

UMHK   Union Minière du Haut-Katanga

Note
At the end of 1959 and beginning of 1960, the Balubakat joined with the Fédéka (Fédération des Associations des Ressortissants de la Province du Kasai au Katanga) and the Atcar (Association Sociale et Culturelle des Tshokwe du Congo, de l’Angola et de la Rhodésie) to form the ‘Cartel Katangais’. [See Source 16, page 22.]
The secession of Katanga, 1960-1965: possible lines of enquiry

If students are to come to understand the issues events of the case study, they will need to explore the reasons why Katanga seceded from the newly-independent Congo and, also, why that secession did not ultimately succeed in making Katanga an independent state. A two-pronged enquiry such as the following may be helpful in this regard:

A. Why did the province of Katanga secede from the newly-independent Congo in 1960?

B. Why did the attempt at secession by Katanga ultimately end in failure?

What are the potential benefits of using these questions to focus on the subject matter of the case study?

In the pages that follow, a list of significant points for each prong of the enquiry is followed by a selection of linked primary source extracts and some secondary source extracts.

Key players

Patrice Lumumba

Moise Tshombe

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qn7vHwnCxqA

A possible ‘hook’

One could begin with a newsreel film clip relating to some of the events of independence, and use this as a ‘launching’ point for the enquiry. A suitable clip may be downloaded from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qn7vHwnCxqA

www.liceoberchet.it

www.gymnyon.vd.ch/enseignement/cours/assassinats/Lumumba10.html

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Transcript of newsreel film clip

Date: 4th August, 1960

Title: CONGO CRISIS  Belgian paratroops withdrawn from Congo arrive at Belgium airport

Transcript:

As the centre of crisis in the Congo shifts to rebellious Katanga province, the first Belgian paratroops to be withdrawn arrive at Brussels. This contingent, the first of fifteen hundred men, is personally greeted by King Baudouin. Eighty-five hundred Belgian troops remain in the Congo, but they have turned over to the United Nations the task of maintaining order against the violence in which these paratroops were wounded. The paras get an heroic welcome. Feelings still run high at the rioting and upheaval that followed Congolese independence.

Ten thousand United Nations troops are now spread across the vast area of the new state. A major current problem is mineral-wealthy Katanga province which keeps close links with Belgium. Pursuing independence of its own, Katanga opposes intervention in its territory and has a delegation in Brussels conferring with the Belgian government. A grave and complex crisis continues with no easy end in view.

Analysis of the newsreel film clip

The “Description, Interpretation and Wider Context” approaches set out in the Leaving Certificate History Guidelines for Teachers can be adapted for use in interrogating newsreel film clips such as this. See page 24 of the Guidelines for an approach to the analysis of written sources. The interrogation of other types of sources is explored on pages 26 to 32 of the Guidelines.

Description

↓

Interpretation

↓

Wider context

The worksheet on the following page shows how the approach may be applied to the newsreel film clip.
Analysis of the newsreel film clip [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qn7vHwnCxqA]

Description (visual)

Visual: What is the title which appears at the beginning of the clip?

Who are the first people to appear on screen?

What are these people doing?

Describe the appearance of King Baudouin when he appears on screen.

What kind of interaction between the King and some of the soldiers do we see on screen?

After the airport scenes, who are the people (some black, some white) who appear on screen towards the end of the clip? (You will need to listen to the commentary to help you with this.)

Description (commentary)

Look at the first paragraph of the transcript. What are we told about (a) the crisis in the Congo (b) the withdrawal of Belgian troops (c) the role of UN troops and (d) the Belgian public’s response to the Belgian soldiers and the Congo Crisis?

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Interpretation:

Whose perspective(s) is/are represented in the clip?

What impressions are given about the “upheaval that followed Congolese independence”?

What points of detail are used in the commentary to support the statement that the crisis is “A grave and complex” one?

Whose perspective is/are missing from the clip and its commentary?

Wider context:

Why was there “upheaval” when independence came?

Why (and in what sense) was Katanga “Pursuing independence of its own”?

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Enquiry, Step 1: Why did the province of Katanga secede from the newly-independent Congo in 1960?

Among the factors identified in commentaries are:

- the determination of the Belgian government and Belgian mining interests to retain control over economic interests in the Congo and particularly in the province of Katanga
- the political ambitions of Moise Tshombe to be the dominant player in the region
- the historical experience of Katanga as a ‘special case’, a place apart
- and the tribal differences that were open to political manipulation

Relevant sources

**The programme of the Conakat**  
*Confederation Des Associations Tribales du Katanga*

**Source 1**

Program
- For autonomy of Katanga and union with Belgium
- For the monopoly of public funds by ‘authentic Katangans’
- For measures favourable to the authority of traditional rulers

*(Lessor du Congo, May 26, 1959, “Conakat position”)*


**Source 2**

Since the creation of the Conakat section in Kilwezi on June 14, 1959, rumors against this association have been spread throughout the African quarters by certain non-Katangan Congolese. They allege that the Conakat was created to evacuate or chase out all people from other provinces. This is not the case and is an illusion pure and simple on the part of these non-Katangans. Here are our goals:

a. Union of all the original residents of the province of Katanga, black and white, without racial discrimination, who by their behavior have shown that they have been integrated into the province;

b. Protection of the legitimate rights of the original residents of this province;

c. Reciprocal benefits in the moral, material, physical, and intellectual evolution of the province and of its inhabitants

d. To struggle henceforth against seizure of any power in this province by a non-Katangan;

e. To cooperate actively with Belgium towards the goal of accession to independence, but with order and calm and above all without precipitate haste.

*(Phare du Katanga, July 3, 1959)*

Jules Gérard-Libois (1966, p.296)
Positions of the Belgian authorities on the structure of the Congo

Source 3

Far from imposing on these people wholly European solutions, we intend to favour original adaptations, answering to the character and to the traditions which these people hold dear. In this regard, a broad decentralization, in conjunction with an extension of the electoral system and the abandonment of all discrimination between European and African, will permit the burgeoning development of the different regions to be hastened along their diverse paths according to their geographic, cultural, and racial particularities as well as to their different levels of economic development.

(Royal Message, January 13, 1959)
Jules Gérard-Libois (1966, p.314)

Source 4

Katanga, under the impetus of its European population, has always been marked by a lively particularism. The province is very rich and sparsely populated so that it fears that a unitary structure would bring it more sacrifices than advantage: it does not wish to remain forever, as it has felt itself for some time to be, the provider for the poor regions of the Congo. The most forward spirits periodically play with the idea of separatism, but by and large a federal structure would be considered as a sufficient guarantee.

(Report on federalism by Alain Stennans, secretary of the government in Leopoldville, August 24, 1959)
Jules Gérard-Libois (1966, p.315)

Belga-Congo news service dispatch on electoral climate in Elizabethville, December 1959

Source 5

It can be said that the city votes under the banner of independent Katanga. Saturday, the different parties held public meetings but the Conakat was the most active in the various communities, where it organized parades with cars and trucks. Conakat President Moise Tshombe made a speech in which he tried to trace the political future of Katanga. His principal points were:

A sovereign Katanga accepts the idea of federal unity under certain minimal conditions. Tshombe officially reserves a place for the traditional chiefs whose roles remain fundamental in the present structure, which can only evolve by degrees if it is to escape the convulsions and extremism which have taken place in many countries recently advanced to independence. Tshombe added: “Whether a federal Congo with a Katangan state is possible or not, Katanga will, in any case, seek a community with Belgium.”

Text of the proclamation of independence of Katanga, July 11, 1960 (extracts)

Belgium has granted independence to the Congo …
What do we behold at present?
Throughout the Congo and particularly in Katanga … . we see a tactic of disorganization and terror at work, a tactic which we have seen applied in numerous instances and in how many countries now under Communist dictatorship.

After improper elections in certain provinces, which gave the majority to a certain party … a central government with an extremist majority was constituted.

Hardly was it constituted, before this government attempted to meddle in affairs which properly belonged solely within the competent jurisdiction of the provincial governments.

… Since July 5, soldiers knowing no discipline have given themselves over acts of insubordination, of threats, to brutalities aimed principally against the European population, to searches and illegal arrests, to pillages, and finally, to murders.

The goal of these maneuvers and their premeditation were amply proven by the repeated protests of the Prime Minister of the Congo against the dispatch of Belgian troops from Belgium to protect property and human lives.

We declare that what the current central Congolese government wants is nothing less than the disintegration of the whole military and administrative apparatus, the installation of a regime of terror which ousts our Belgian colleagues.

… Under these circumstances … the Katangan government has decided to proclaim the independence of Katanga.

This INDEPENDENCE IS TOTAL. However, aware of the imperative necessity for economic cooperation with Belgium, the Katangan government, to which Belgium has just granted the assistance of its own troops to protect human life, calls upon Belgium to join with Katanga in close economic community.  

Jules Gérard-Libois (1966, pp.328-9)

Source 7

A cartoonist’s view

Michael Cummings, Daily Express, 2nd August, 1960 © Express Syndication
Source 8

National Anthem of Katanga

La KATANGAISE
Hymne National du Katanga.

Martiale M = 136

Musique de J.F. Joseph Mwelo,
Ministre de l'Éducation Nationale.

Alons, Alons, Marchons,
Katangais valeureux,
L'ennemi destructeur, et un bon farceur,
Rode sur nos fondateurs,
Vite, valeureux guerriers,
Maintiens l'enceinte du pays la patrie oppressé.

Enfants du Katanga (bis)
Défendez le jusqu'à la mort,
Rendez-le fier, écrasez-le fort,
Avec vos bras et votre sang,
Avec vos dents.

Alongs, Alongs, Marchons,
Katangais valeureux,
Notre bannière en vent, symbole pour tous ceux,
Qui nos richesses gardent,
Et au reste jeunesse,
La roue force aussi continuent d'alégorie.

Enfants du Katanga (bis)
Défendez-le jusqu'à la mort,
Rendez-le fier, écrasez-le fort,
Avec vos bras et votre sang,
Avec vos dents.

http://www.nationalanthems.info/kat.htm

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Source 8, National Anthem of Katanga: English translation

Come, Come, March, brave citizens of Katanga.
The sun rose on the ground of your ancestors
From the old homestead of heaven to the depths.
You saw the opulent call of happiness.

Children of Katanga

Children of Katanga,
Defend to the death
With pride and with strength
With your arms and your blood

Come, Come, March, brave citizens of Katanga.
The enemy destroys like a raging lion
Lurks on our borders
Your warlike valour
Keeps oppression outside our country.

Come, Come, March, brave citizens of Katanga
Our banner in the wind, a symbol for all those
The crosslets are our riches
And green is our youth
Red is our strength also our joy

Source 9

Conor Cruise O’Brien, UN Special Envoy to the Congo, on economic implications of the secession

All taxes formerly paid to the central treasury of the Belgian Congo had now to be paid to the State of Katanga. The principal taxpayers were, of course, the European interests – notably the great mining consortium, Union Minière du Haut Katanga … These accepted the authority of the State of Katanga to levy these taxes … The export duty on copper, which was to have gone to the central government in Leopoldville, now was to be paid to Mr Tshombe’s government. The export duties paid by the Union Minière alone had amounted to half the export revenue of the former Belgian Congo. ‘The whole economy of the Congo’, declared the semi-official Belgian Agence Economique et Financière in June 1960, ‘finds a solid foundation in the existence of the Union Minière.’ The same source had estimated that the Congo exchequer was receiving 3,000 million Belgian Francs – the indispensable basis of the Congolese economy – as ‘a product of the activity of the Union Minière’… . The economy of the Congo was now to be deprived of its ‘solid’ and ‘indispensable basis’, and the revenues in question were actually to be used against the Republic of the Congo.

Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back. (London: Hutchinson, 1962, p.87)
Questions on the sources (pages 13-17)

1. According to Source 1, what were the political aims of the Conakat, the party led by Moïse Tshombe?
2. According to Source 1, public funds in Katanga should be controlled by “Authentic Katangans”. What do you think is meant by this phrase? Check your answer (which may well be mistaken) against the description contained in goal ‘a’ of the Conakat goals as set out in Source 2.
3. In Source 1, whose interests are the third item of the ‘program’ intended to protect?
4. In Source 2, what rumour about the aims of the Conakat is mentioned in the first paragraph? What is the Conakat’s response to these rumours?
5. **Show your critical awareness**: In relation to Source 2, comment on the use of the expressions “original residents” in goals (a) and (b) and “integrated into the province” in goal (a).
6. In Source 2, what does goal (d) suggest would be the likely reaction of Katanga to the establishment of an independent Congolese state?
7. In Source 2, goal (e), what political aims are put forward by the Conakat?
8. **Show your critical awareness**: In Source 3, what kind of post-independence political arrangements in the Congo does the king foresee? Would these arrangements favour or disadvantage movement towards the independence of Katanga?
9. In Source 4, how is Katanga identified as being different from other parts of the Congo? What hints are there that Katanga could possibly go its own way in the future?
10. **Show your critical awareness**: Does Source 5 confirm or contradict the aspects of the Conakat position that were found in previous sources? Explain your answer.
11. In Source 6, what accusations are made against the government of newly-independent Congo, in which Patrice Lumumba was prime minister?
12. What aspect of the purported independence of Katanga is made clear in the last paragraph of Source 6?
13. What is the essential message of Source 7, in your judgement?
14. In Source 8, what feelings among the citizens of Katanga does the national anthem seek to arouse?
15. In Source 8 – and bearing in mind your reading of previous sources – who is “the enemy” that “Lurks on our borders”?
16. According to Source 9, what economic advantages did Katanga gain from its secession and its support for Belgian interests?
17. According to Source 9, how was the central government of the Congo affected by the support of the Union Minière for the secession of Katanga?
Enquiry, Step 2: Why did the attempt at secession by Katanga ultimately end in failure?

Among the factors identified in commentaries are:

- the attempts by Lumumba and other Congolese politicians to keep intact the territory granted independence by Belgium
- the role of the UN following Lumumba’s requests for intervention but, in particular, the increased mandate granted to UN forces in the Congo following Lumumba’s murder in January 1961
- the international outcry following Lumumba’s murder
- the presence within Katanga itself of substantial internal opposition to the secession

Source 10
Speech by Patrice Lumumba on independence day, 30th June 1960 (extracts)

For this independence of the Congo, even as it is celebrated today … no Congolese worthy of the name will ever be able to forget that it was by fighting that it has been won [applause], a day-to-day fight, an ardent and idealistic fight, a fight in which we were spared neither privation nor suffering, and for which we gave our strength and our blood

…We have witnessed atrocious sufferings of those condemned for their political opinions or religious beliefs, exiled in their own country, their fate truly worse than death itself …

The Republic of the Congo has been proclaimed, and our country is now in the hands of its own children. Together, my brothers, my sisters, we are going to begin a new struggle, a sublime struggle, which will lead our country to peace, prosperity and greatness …

… Belgium, at last accepting the flow of history, has not tried to oppose our independence and is ready to give us their aid and their friendship … On our side, while we stay vigilant, we shall respect our obligations, given freely.

… I ask all of you, legislators and citizens, to help me with all your strength.

I ask all of you to forget your tribal quarrels. They exhaust us. They risk making us despised abroad.

I ask the parliamentary minority to help my government through a constructive opposition and to limit themselves strictly to legal and democratic channels.

In conclusion, I ask you unconditionally to respect the life and the property of your fellow citizens and of foreigners living in our country. If the conduct of these foreigners leaves something to be desired, our justice will be prompt in expelling them from the territory of the republic; if, on the contrary, their conduct is good, they must be left in peace, for they also are working for our country’s prosperity …
A Congolese politician’s opposition to the secession

Source 11
Neither Tshombe, nor certain of his ministers, nor the Union Minière, nor the Belgians who are behind the Katanga secession will stop the Congolese people from recovering their heritage.


The murder of Lumumba, January 1961

Extracts from Irish Times reports (All Irish Times material used with kind permission)

Source 12 KATANGANS MAY HAVE KILLED LUMUMBA
Officials and public in Leopoldville yesterday were sceptical of the report that Mr. Lumumba and two other prisoners had escaped from detention in Katanga.

One member of the U.N. Conciliation Commission said, “This is a cover-up story. He has probably been shot. If he has been killed there will be no peace in the Congo for 20 years.”


Source 13 WORLD LEADERS SHOCKED BY LUMUMBA’S MURDER
U.N. force alerted to prevent reprisals
The murder of Mr. Lumumba … has plunged the Congo into the most serious crisis of its turbulent history. United Nations troops throughout the vast new State were alerted as the news spread, arousing fears of reprisals against Europeans and Congolese opposed to the murdered prime minister …

… In the U.N. Security Council, Mr. Hammarskjold called for an immediate international investigation of the crime …

Mr. Nehru, one of the many world leaders who expressed profound shock at the death of Mt. Lumumba, said: “Murder has been committed – probably by people who occupy high places.” President Kennedy said that he was deeply disturbed by the news.

Irish Times, 14th February, 1961.

Source 14 LUMUMBA SHOT DEAD BY BELGIAN OFFICER
Ghana President’s version of killing
It was suggested during the week-end that Mr. Lumumba, the Congo’s first Prime Minister, was shot dead by a Belgian officer on January 18th.

This is a contradiction of the announcement made last Monday by the Katanga Government that Mr. Lumumba and his two aides – Mr. Maurice Mpolo and Mr. Joseph Okito – had been killed by villagers after escaping from a farmhouse prison near Elizabethville on the previous Thursday.

Irish Times, 20th February, 1961

Note: A Belgian parliamentary inquiry, which reported in 2002, found that the Belgian government was “morally responsible” for Lumumba’s death, and a public apology was issued later that year. This followed the publication of The Assassination of Lumumba by Ludo de Witte, a Dutch historian, in 1999.
Increasing diplomatic isolation of Katanga

Secondary Source 1

After Lumumba’s death, the Belgian attitude vis-à-vis Katanga secession changed significantly. It was the view of the Belgian government that the integrity of the Congolese territory had to be preserved in a federal system. However, Tshombe refused to participate in the post-Lumumba government led by Ileo. Tshombe’s insistence on separation caused diplomatic isolation of his Katanga government.


Secondary Source 2

Diplomatic isolation was another major weakness. In spite of countless demarches, overtures, bribes and promises, the secessionist state never gained international recognition. Even Belgium never officially recognized Katanga.


Source 15

An English cartoonist (David Low)’s representation of Tshombe (and other international statesmen of the time) December 1961

© PDST, 2010
Internal opposition to the secession

Source 16
INTERNAL DISPUTE IN KATANGA

The Opposition Cartel Party walked out of the Katanga Assembly yesterday in Elizabethville in protest against the method used by the Prime Minister, Mr. Tshombe, and his Government to declare Katanga’s independence. The Opposition leader, Mr. Prosper Mwamba, dashed hopes of a quiet settlement of internal disputes when he led a walkabout of 14 Cartel members present after laying down conditions for Cartel support for independence and participation in the Government.

Before the walkout, Mr. Mwamba warned that, if a coalition Government were not formed in the province, his Cartel Party would be obliged to set up its own Government in north-east Katanga, where it has popular support from the Baluba tribe. He appealed to Mr. Tshombe to find a solution to the current crisis as soon as possible — before force had to be used against the people. (Reuters)

The Irish Times, Thursday, 28th July, 1960

Source 17
CHIEFS CALL FOR TSHOMBE’S ARREST

Eight tribal chiefs of South Katanga, in a letter published in New York yesterday, asked for the formation of a new Government in Elizabethville and the arrest of Mr. Tshombe. The signatories included Mr. Tshombe’s father-in-law, Chief Mwata-Yamvo, of the Lunda tribe; Chief Kasongo Niembo, a powerful Baluba chieftain, formerly loyal to Mr. Tshombe, and the Bayeke Chief Mwanda-Munongo, elder brother of the Katanga Interior Minister, Mr. Godefroid Munongo. … …

The chiefs’ letter, addressed to Premier Adoula, offered “deep gratitude and sincere devotion” to his Government and “warm thanks” to the United Nations, which it said had supported, at the cost of lives, the Government’s action “for the liberation of our regions which have suffered so much from the interested dictatorship of a group of men in the pay of Belgian, English, French and Portuguese imperialist colonialists.”

It added: “We have ourselves witnessed with our own eyes the massacres perpetrated against innocent civilians by the Belgian personnel of the Union Minière and the mercenaries in the service of the traitor Tshombe.”

The Irish Times, Wednesday, 9th January, 1963

Secondary Source 3

That the secession lasted as long as it did (from July 11, 1960, to January 14, 1963) is largely a reflection of the efforts of Belgian civilian and military authorities to prop up their client state. Yet from the very beginning, the operation ran into serious difficulties. A major handicap faced by “authentic Katangese” stemmed from their inability to come to terms with the Balubakat-instigated revolt in the north. Despite the numerous military expeditions against northern “rebels”, at no time was the Tshombe regime able to claim effective control of the Luba areas. Further discredit was cast on Tshombe when, in January 1961, Balubakat leaders proclaimed the secession of their own northern province, presumably out of loyalty to the principle of a united Congo. Balubakat seceding from the secessionists for the sake of unity was a painful logic for Conakat to assimilate.

UN resolutions on Katanga (extracts)

Source 18
Resolution adopted by the Security Council on August 9, 1960 (886th session), extracts

_The Security Council_
… _Calls upon_ the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from Katanga … and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council’s resolutions;
… _Declares_ that the entry of the United Nations Force into the province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution;
… _Reaffirms_ that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise …

(Security Council, S/4426)

Source 19
Resolution adopted by the Security Council on February 21-22, 1961 (942nd session) [following news of Lumumba’s murder], extracts

_The Security Council_
_Having considered_ the situation in the Congo,
_Having learned with deep regret_ the announcement of the killing of the Congolese leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Maurice Mpolo, and Mr. Joseph Okito,
_Deeper concerned_ at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger of widespread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to international peace and security,
_Noticing_ the report of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (S/4691) dated February 12, 1961, bringing to light the development of a serious civil war situation and preparations therefor,

1. _Urges_ that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort
2. _Urges_ that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and mercenaries
3. _Calls upon_ all states to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories, and for the denial of transit and other facilities to them;

Security Council, S/4722
Conor Cruise O’Brien on the background to the UN resolution of February, 1961

The session of the Security Council that followed the announcement of Patrice Lumumba’s death was the stormiest in the history of the United Nations. Large numbers of young blacks, furious at what they regarded as the betrayal and murder of Lumumba, filled the auditorium and chanted slogans. When security guards tried to eject some of them the guards were overwhelmed. Young women wearing shoes with stiletto heels were particularly effective. The imperative case for a change of course was dramatically demonstrated.

Against this dramatic background the Security Council, with the necessary agreement of all five Permanent Members, carried its resolution of February 21, 1961, of which the cutting edge was contained in Paragraphs A1 and A2 …


Stronger UN action against Katanga, 1961-1963

Michael Cummings, *Daily Express*, 30 November, 1961 © Express Syndication
Source 22

[From December 8 to 14, 1961, the U.N. reported military action at the following places:]
… at the Sabena Guest House, where the Katangese were cleared out on 8 December; at the airfield, where attacking Katangese forces were repulsed; in the neighborhood of the Baluba refugee camp which was repeatedly fired upon by the Katangese gendarmerie, with heavy loss of life; at the transmitter of Radio Katanga, which continued to broadcast calls to arms and which was damaged by United Nations jet aircraft; at Camp Massart, which was strafed on 10 December by United Nations aircraft; and at ONUC headquarters, which continued to be subjected to heavy fire. Elsewhere in Katanga, in particular at Manono, the gendarmerie was disarmed by the ONUC troops. On 9 December, ONUC carried out an air strike in the centre of Elizabethville, against the post office, which was being used for Katangese military communications and for inflammatory broadcasts …


Secondary Source 4

On Christmas eve, 1962, Katangan gendarmes started firing at a U.N. observation post in Elizabethville. General shooting followed, but UNF troops did not return fire … [Tshombe] promised to stop the fighting, but by December 27 he appeared to have lost control of his gendarmerie.
The next day, U.N. officials formally notified Tshombe that unless firing against its forces ceased, they would “take all necessary action in self-defense and to restore order.” The firing continued, and on December 28, U.N. units started to move against gendarmerie strong points in Elizabethville. …

Within three days, the UNF had completed phase one of its plan to establish freedom of movement in Katanga. Elizabethville and the surrounding area to a depth of about fifteen miles was under U.N. control. The UNF also held the towns of Kamina and Kipushi and strategic rail points. …

There was a brief let-up in U.N. military action after phase one, presumably to negotiate with Tshombe; but on December 30, Robert A. K. Gardiner, the U.N. chief of operations in Leopoldville, made it clear that he was “not going to make the mistake of stopping short this time.” … [pp.107-108]

On January 11, 1963, UNF troops entered Sakania, near the Rhodesian border. Ten days later, Tshombe agreed to the entry of U.N. forces into Kolwezi, to the removal of all mines and demolition charges, and to the surrender of all gendarmerie weapons to the UNF. On January 21, U.N. troops entered Kolwezi without resistance and were personally welcomed by Tshombe. This marked the end of the military phase of bringing Katanga under the control of the United Nations and the Central Government.

 Mobutu’s role

Secondary Source 5

A
[1960] … Lumumba … appointed Mobutu, one of the two junior ministers in the prime minister’s office, as colonel and chief of staff of the ANC … Lumumba made a serious blunder based on his overconfidence in commanding the confidence of the people around him and his political naïvety. He refused to listen to apparently well-founded rumours about Mobutu’s ties to the Belgian and American intelligence services. In appointing Mobutu to this sensitive position, he had unwittingly chosen his own Judas. [p.98]

B
Mobutu’s friends had been encouraging him to stage … [a coup] which he did on 14 September … Officially, Mobutu declared his intention as that of temporarily neutralizing both Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu politically. Until the situation improves or returns to normal, he promised, the country was to be run by a college of commissioners made up of university graduates and students under the presidency of Justin Bomboko, foreign minister in Lumumba’s cabinet. In reality, this was a coup against Lumumba. [pp.108-109]

C
[1961] The moderates who had taken over the central government in Kinshasa rushed to conclude a military alliance with the very secessionist forces against which they were supposed to be fighting in Katanga and South Kasai. On 27 February 1961, Joseph Ileo, the interim prime minister, signed a military accord in Lubumbashi with Tshombe and Kalonji. This was followed by regular meetings between Mobutu and high-level representatives of the two secessionist governments in Brazzaville and Lubumbashi … [pp.121-122]

D
The most important factor in the ascendancy of the unitarists [those who favoured a unitary state] in the moderate camp was their control of the central state machinery, particularly its key organs, which were closely linked to external sources of assistance and pressure. The most important of these organs were the military, the security police, the foreign ministry, the central bank and the internal affairs apparatus, which remained under the control of Mobutu, Nendaka, Bomboko, Albert Ndele and Damien Kandolo, respectively. These five men formed the nucleus of what came to be known as the Binza Group … This politically powerful clique worked closely with American, Belgian and UN officials, and imposed its will on President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Adoula. [pp.124-125]

E
The political defeat of the Lumumbists in the externally orchestrated political manoeuvres of the Binza Group in 1962-63 coincided with the victory of the central government over the secessionists in South Kasai and Katanga. With the radical threat apparently out of the way, the authorities in Kinshasa knew that their external masters would no longer be displeased with the restoration of national unity and territorial integrity … Tshombe’s … secession was too tall an order for Mobutu’s army. The task of ending it was finally entrusted to UN troops in December 1962, and the Katanga secession was over by the end of January 1963. [p.125]

F
… it was Mobutu who took centre stage politically as the leader of the Binza Group. Although remaining in the background until 1965, he was behind every major decision taken in Kinshasa since September 1960. [p.pp.144-145]

Questions on the sources (pages 20-27)

1. In Source 10, Lumumba refers to the fight for independence as an “idealistic fight”. What ideals does Lumumba set before the Congolese people in Source 10?
2. In Source 10, what reference does Lumumba make to internal divisions and the damage they can cause?
3. In Source 10, what steps need to be taken, according to Lumumba, to preserve and develop the newly independent Congo?
4. According to Adoula, in Source 11, what are the principal forces that need to be confronted if the Congolese people are to ‘recover their heritage’ (and, by implication, end the secession of Katanga.)
5. According to Source 12, what was the reaction of (a) the public and (b) U.N. officials to reports that Lumumba had been shot while trying to escape from custody in Katanga?
6. According to Source 13, what was the reaction to Lumumba’s murder of (a) the general public in the Congo and (b) international leaders?
7. According to Source 14, what was (a) the Katanga government’s version and (b) the Ghana President’s version of the killing of Lumumba? Which version did the Belgian government parliamentary inquiry of 2002 accept?
8. According to Secondary Source 1, how did the Belgian government’s attitude to Katanga change after Lumumba’s murder? How did this change affect relations between the Belgian government and Tshombe.
9. According to Secondary Source 2, what major weakness did Katanga face in an international context?
10. In Source 15, what view of Tshombe does the cartoonist present? Explain your answer. (You may wish to research the message behind the representation of the other leaders.)
11. In Source 15, is the ‘Man of the year’ tag serious or ironic? Explain your answer.
12. In Source 16, what factors lay behind the walkout from the Katanga parliament of Mr. Mwamba and his Cartel Party members?
13. According to Source 17, who was calling for the arrest of Tshombe?
14. According to Source 17, what wrongs had been committed by Tshombe and with whose assistance?
15. What major internal problem in Katanga does Secondary Source 3 discuss?
16. In Source 18, what were the main actions in the Congo that the resolution sought to bring about?
17. What detail in Source 18 could be seen as limiting the capacity of U.N. forces to overturn the secession of Katanga?
18. In Source 19, what did the U.N. Security Council see as potential dangers created by the killing of Lumumba?
19. In Source 19, what phrase in the resolution made possible the subsequent use of military force to end the secession of Katanga?
20. In Source 20, what “dramatic background” to the passing of the resolution of February 1961 does Cruise O’Brien describe?
21. In Source 20, what does Cruise O’Brien have in mind when he writes about the “cutting edge” of the motion of February 1961? (See Source 19.)
22. In your view, what point is the cartoonist in Source 21 making about the effects of stronger U.N. intervention on the situation in the Congo?

23. According to Source 22, which U.N. military actions of December 1961 appear to have been most successful?

24. In Source 22, what accusation is made against the Katangese gendarmerie who were being put under pressure by the U.N. forces?

25. In Source 22, why did U.N. forces attack the transmitter of Radio Katanga and the post office in Elizabethville?

26. According to Secondary Source 4, why did U.N. forces start to move against the gendarmerie in Elizabethville on 28th December, 1962?

27. According to Secondary Source 4, what successes had the U.N. forces achieved by 31st December, 1962?

28. Based on what you know about earlier U.N. involvement, what do you think Robert A. K. Gardiner, the U.N. chief of operations in Leopoldville, meant when he said, on 30th December, 1962, that he was “not going to make the mistake of stopping short this time”?

29. According to Secondary Source 5A, why did Lumumba make “a serious blunder” when he appointed Mobutu as army chief of staff?

30. In Secondary Source 5B, what difference does the writer identify between Mobutu’s ‘official’ declaration of his intentions on 14th September and what his real purpose was?

31. Secondary Source 5C refers to the ‘moderates’, such as Mobutu and Ileo, who had taken over the central government (from the radicals such as Lumumba). What stance towards the secession of Katanga did these moderates take in the early months of 1961?

32. According to Secondary Source 5D, who were the ‘Binza Group’?

33. According to Secondary Source 5D, why were the Binza Group so powerful?

34. According to Secondary Source 5E, what threat had to be overcome before the central government could seek to bring about “the restoration of national unity and territorial integrity” by ending the secession of Katanga?

35. According to Secondary Source 5E, why was the central government content to leave the ending of the secession to U.N. troops?

36. In Secondary Source 5F, how does the writer summarise Mobutu’s role in the Congo (including the secession of Katanga) during the period 1960-1965?

**Key player/key personality: Mobutu**

http://www.cachecoins.org/zaire.htm
A critical skills exercise

In order to focus student attention on some of the key issues relating to the secession of Katanga, it may be helpful to use an exercise such as that exemplified on the pages that follow. The rationale below is reproduced from the booklet used in Phase 5 of the HIST in-service.

Documents-based study

Development of critical skills

Documents-based question

The documents-based study is “the primary means of developing their skills in working with evidence”. (S.5)
The documents-based question, “will test candidates’ ability to interrogate, correlate and evaluate a particular body of evidence”. (S.15)

Rationale for the exercise

The intention of the exercise is to illustrate in a practical and active manner the type of critical skills that the documents-based study is designed to develop. The exercise is a group exercise designed to illustrate the type of critical skills that underlie the documents-based study, and one way in which these skills may be developed in a classroom setting.

Essentially, the purpose of the exercise is to encourage students to THINK by discussing snippets of evidence and attempting to make judgements on their significance by deciding whether they support or oppose a particular proposition. The PLAY element is important and the exercise should be an engaging one for students. The intention is not to come up with “answers” that are either right or wrong: much of the value of the exercise is in the process itself. That said, it should be possible to reach consensus in most cases and to clarify misunderstandings – where these arise – in the process.

What is involved

Each group of 4-5 students is given an A4 sheet with a proposition at the top of the page and two columns headed, Agrees and Disagrees. Each group is also given an envelope containing 8-12 short documentary extracts – each on its own small strip of paper – and the task is to discuss with each other the appropriate column in which to place each extract. At least one or two of the extracts should be capable of generating uncertainty as to which column is the appropriate one. It is better if the provenance of the source is not revealed at the outset – although it is possible that some may be recognised by individual students – since the absence of such a contextual framework forces students to focus more closely on the extract as presented. When each group has reached its conclusions, the outcome of the exercise is discussed in a whole group setting. If deemed appropriate, the exercise can end with a “guessing game” where students are asked to link each extract to the correct name from a list read out by the teacher.

The following three pages contain materials that will be used to exemplify this approach.
Proposition: The secession of Katanga was motivated by a wish to keep control over mineral resources in the province

Place each of the source extracts in the appropriate column, depending on whether you think it agrees or disagrees with the above proposition. If the group cannot agree on whether a particular extract agrees or disagrees with the proposition, place it along the dividing line in the middle and wait to hear what other groups have to say about the extract.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agrees</th>
<th>Disagrees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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**Source A**  
Tshombe had always worked closely with the Belgian financial interests. The financial interests, in turn, enthusiastically supported Katanga’s secession.

**Source E**  
It is thanks to our soldiers that Katanga has been able to maintain her independence and give the elements remaining in the Congo time to begin the elimination of Lumumba, thereby saving the Congo and the whole of Central Africa from Communist capture.

**Source B**  
… before the dangers we would bring down upon us by prolonging our submission to the arbitrary will and Communitistic intentions of the central government, the Katangan government has decided to proclaim the independence of Katanga.

**Source F**  
… the Belgians … had been only too ready to return to and manipulate the situation so as to safeguard their investments. In Katanga British and Belgian capitalist interests …used their influence in support of Tshombe’s secession.

**Source C**  
Katanga has always been a company province. What passed for politics in that part of the world was always partially a responsibility of the important business leaders.

**Source G**  
My own feeling is that Belgium has no intention of giving up the Congo; in other words, that she will play her political cards so as to maintain her economic footing.

**Source D**  
We have ourselves witnessed with our own eyes the massacres perpetrated against innocent civilians by the Tshombe soldiers, and the destruction of the country’s economic apparatus by the Belgian personnel of the Union Minière and the mercenaries in the service of the traitor Tshombe.

**Source H**  
From the character and arguments of Mr. Tshombe’s friends abroad, I thought it likely that his regime was indeed – as his critics said – a device for preserving local European, and outside financial, control of this very profitable territory.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source URL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source E</strong></td>
<td>Moise Tshombe</td>
<td>From a report in <em>The Irish Times</em>, 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; July, 1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source F</strong></td>
<td>Guy Arnold</td>
<td><em>Africa: A Modern History</em></td>
<td>Atlantic Books, 2005, pps 88-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source B</strong></td>
<td>Jules Gérard-Libois (translated by Rebecca Young)</td>
<td><em>Katanga Secession</em>. (University of Wisconsin Press, 1966, p.329)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source G</strong></td>
<td>Jack White, report in <em>The Irish Times</em></td>
<td>Friday, February 19, 1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source C</strong></td>
<td>Collin Gonze</td>
<td>In <em>Katanga Secession: The New Colonialism</em></td>
<td>Indiana University Press, 1962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source H</strong></td>
<td>Conor Cruise O’Brien</td>
<td><em>Memoir: My Life and Themes</em> (Poolbeg Press, 1998, p.211)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source D</strong></td>
<td>Letter from 8 tribal chiefs of South Katanga</td>
<td>As reported in <em>The Irish Times</em>, Wednesday, January 9, 1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Your conclusions on the enquiry

Based on the evidence you have encountered in the course of the enquiry, draw up

(a) a list of what you think are the THREE most important reasons why the province of Katanga seceded from the newly-independent Congo and

(b) a list of what you think are the THREE most important reasons why the attempt at secession ended in failure

Make your case in a written report, devoting one paragraph (or more) to each of the reasons identified.

OR

Now that we have looked at a wide range of evidence on

(a) why Katanga broke away from the Congo and made itself independent and

(b) why its attempt to be independent ended in failure

- What do you think are the TWO main reasons why Katanga broke away from the Congo?

- What do you think are the two main reasons why Katanga’s attempt to remain independent of the Congo ended in failure?

- For each of the reasons you give, you must back up your reason with evidence from the primary sources (such as newspaper reports, film clips and cartoons) or secondary sources (such as extracts from the writings of historians) that we have studied.